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**MONOGRAPH
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OUR CONCERNS**

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Gratitude

I thank my parents and my family in general for always supporting me in my ideas somewhat crazy but never without some criticism on their part. To my teachers, who I have

always respected them for their passion for teaching and because they have allowed me the environment to develop as a person in different fields. Finally, I thank my closest friends, of which I believe I have learned many things, either by good or bad actions on their part or on my part, and by their sincerity at the time of seeing my work.

Abstract

This monograph seeks to observe the topic of personal identity throughout history, putting certain general perspectives on various classical authors and contemporary philosophers and then give way to an analysis of the positions. In addition to playing a merely descriptive role, showing the frames of reference with which each author departs, the aim

was to show the criticizable behind each position using arguments in which they contained mental experiments, conceptual problems and points that seem to question our deepest intuitions.

The dominant positions in the contemporary debate are animalism, the idea that all people in our case are human animals and psychological continuity, the idea that what maintains us over time is a connection of causal relationships between certain mental and psychological properties such as memory, beliefs, ideas, personality, among others of the same style. Seeing the criticable of the positions taken by certain authors of the Anglophone world, I analyze certain ideas that seek to break with this way of seeing the problem: the reductionism of our identity to mere psychological and/or physical facts.

After a small observation, I argue that postures do not present the same problems as reductionism but they do present problematic situations where not only it doesn't make them better than reductionism but also inspires us to look for other types of solutions. Faced with this attempt, I propose a new frame of reference on which we can see the question of personal identity and glimpse, after several centuries of debate, a solution that is at least acceptable within the current panorama. Here I try to show that psychological continuity (with certain modifications) is a necessary position but not sufficient to give a complete answer to the matter.

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Introduction

It is common to have a lot of approaches in our daily life that we usually don't question even the smallest detail. What is matter? What is space and time? Is the existence of abstract entities possible? Are there things beyond our perception of them? Do universals exist? Does God exist? Do numbers really exist in the world? How can we understand the idea of identity? Are there possible worlds out there? If so, how? All these questions seek to understand the ultimate structure of reality beyond a mere empirical analysis. This subject is known as metaphysics.

Within this theme, we can find a theme called personal identity. However, this theme is usually used in different senses that are not properly philosophical. In this work, I do not understand personal identity as that idea that exists in the colloquial language of an idea of belonging on the part of a person. For example, we can say that being an analyst or someone concerned about philosophical issues is something that defines me and makes me the person I am.

Another definition is identity in a social sense. We can say that to someone who lives in Ecuador, being Ecuadorian is part of their identity. Leaving aside my judgments on this issue, it is undeniable the effect that culture and society seem to have behind what we

believe we are. Finally, there is identity in psychology that is usually understood as identification, that is, the data that the subject finds that generates a coherent image of what he considers himself.

Here we can speak of identity from a Leibnizian point of view, that is, to understand identity as substitutability. Let's give an example to understand this point. Let us imagine that we have an object A that possesses the properties F. Now let us imagine that we have an object B that possesses the same properties. It is obvious to think that two identical objects have the same properties. This is what this idea of identity is about: starting from the naming of certain objects, either over time or simultaneously, in a different way and then deducing, based on the consideration of facts, whether we are talking about different objects and therefore it is permissible to use those names or, on the other hand, it is the same object with two different names. This can be applied not only to material objects but also to people. This is the question we are interested in.

One may wonder what is the purpose behind this subject. Why is it worth talking about? Beyond the typical answer that man is curious by nature, I think we should consider that this is talking about who we are and that is not something that we have a strong rejection of. In fact, it seems to some as misanthropic to focus on the identity of material objects rather than our own identity. This is important not only theoretically but also practically. For example, is it ethical to blame someone for a crime if it is not the same person who

committed it? If a person ceases to exist and we are properly talking about a different person, what happens to promises, property and our thinking of looking to the future? These questions are not trivial and, in fact, I think they deserve more attention when talking about various issues such as abortion.

The debate about our identity can be traced back to the ancient Greeks and even has its appearance in the Eastern world by Buddhism. However, the debate was formalized in the West thanks to John Locke, who raised many issues worthy of consideration for his time that still have considerable influence on the way the debate is viewed. This author has received many objections that we will review in this work but the important thing is that he planted the seed to see the question when it was obscured or mixed with other issues such as the relationship of mind and body.

To this day, there is no consensus on the answer to this problem and it even seems that there is no clear answer. Despite this, and considering the impression someone might get about it, this does not invalidate the question but reflects what some consider to be the essence of philosophy: questions that do not have clear-cut answers. This should not encourage us to reject complex questions but try to understand what solution we are able to proportionate given our current context.

This work is divided into three parts. The first would be merely descriptive and would seek to recapitulate the debate from the perspectives of the past to the present. The second part is of recognition, that is, of the realization of the underlying problems behind certain opinions concerning this issue. Here I will add both the objections raised by philosophers throughout history and my opinions, in a superficial way, on what I consider to be problems behind various opinions. Finally, the last chapter is a mixture of recognition and opinion because it follows the doubts of the previous chapter but also adds my personal perspectives on what I consider to be a more appropriate framework for shaping this issue and, seeing the ideas behind this debate, giving a response that is consistent and precise about the characteristics to be considered behind our identity over time.

Chapter I

The postures of personal identity to this day

1.1 Answers of classical philosophers

It is essential to put the thoughts of several philosophers who have gone down in history for their original and revolutionary ideas for further analysis on this subject. It is not for less because every philosopher that is seen through their study at present, at least within the analytic tradition, has been for his great variety of interests, to which he has given opinions that have managed to materialize in their works and their enormous ambition to systematize knowledge and generate a contribution to this great company that aims to expand “human” knowledge.

This means that each answer that they have given to several issues is not only worthy of consideration as a reference to different problems that we face today but also worthy of reflection and respect, since behind each particular response that you have used to consider or reject an issue, there is an interrelationship between all their reflections, product of their constant and adequate use of reason to deal with the problems of his time, using a method that has arrived to our days and with luck, because without it our reflection would be full of

chimeras that would come from everywhere, stalking and frustrating our deepest goals and desires.

Therefore, it is a consideration that has not been wished to omit within the present work and that will make the reader to think of one more at the moment of entering in the question that concerns us: personal identity. However, this topic cannot be presented without taking into account the context of each philosopher and their systems. Therefore, it is convenient to highlight their systems and how they can derive their positions with respect to our topic of interest.

1.1.1 Plato and Aristotle

1.1.1.1 The soul and the Theory of Forms.

Plato (427 BC-347 BC) is one of the most important the philosopher of the Western world. From it, ethical, aesthetic, epistemological, metaphysical reflections arise, among others. To understand Plato in all its splendor, one must understand the visions of two pre-socratic philosophers: Parmenides and Heraclitus. We only understand the battle between the One and the multiple, a battle to which he sought a peace treaty.

Parmenides was born in Elea around 515 BC approximately. Today it is recorded by a metaphysical poem that he wrote and in which we only have some fragments left. If it were not for the references given by various authors throughout history, his thesis along with his

argument probably would never have been known. The poem begins with the journey of Parmenides towards the path of the goddess, transported by some mares and guided by the daughters of the sun. He saw the doors of the paths of night and day, where the daughters of the Sun beautifully incite Dike, the one who keeps the keys, to open the doors and so it was. From there you are in contact with a goddess.

The reflection of Parmenides begins with the two paths of the investigation that the goddess poses. One, on what is and it's impossible that it isn't, is the path of confidence, while its opposite, on what is not and it's impossible that it is, is a wrong path from its beginning. The first way is about being. The goddess shows that non-being does not exist and is something that cannot be thought and what is (being) is only that one can think because it is something that exists. Up to this point, what Parmenides says will be too obvious for the reader. However, what can be shown is that change is impossible.

The second way is wrong and the goddess says that it should not be followed as much as the experience, which later becomes a habit, reinforces it. Being, according to Parmenides, is something that could not have been born nor can it cease to exist. The key to understanding this argument is that Parmenides speaks of being in an absolute sense, not in a relative sense. That is to say, for being to be born or cease to exist, it must take a step from being to non-being. Now, non-being is not a place where one goes because it doesn't exist. Therefore, what is (being) hasn't been created or destroyed but has always been.

Parmenides adds certain characteristics to being as being unique, whole, unshakable, perpetual, immutable, self-sustaining, not lacking in anything since it would lack something and, therefore, it would be while it is not. That is an obvious contradiction. It also has a spherical shape. This is just the prejudice of the time because the ancient Greeks considered the sphere as the most perfect geometric figure.

To conclude, it is pointed out that the error of mortals has been to give non-being a name when it was unnecessary. Only being can be thought and, therefore, can be named. There is only what is and nothing else. This is the One.

In contrast to Parmenides, we have Heraclitus. He is known for saying that the arche or vital principle of the cosmos is fire. However, this interpretation of his thought has been discussed, pointing out that fire could be a vital force that encompasses the cosmos, instead of an arche that would be the last components of reality. He mentions that fire is change of all things and all things change of fire. A lot of interpretations have emerged from this thinker. We will limit ourselves to examine certain notions that are commonly accepted in his doctrine.

One of his ideas is that of logos through which we know that all things are One. We have a huge problem in understanding these lines of Heraclitus considering this word is polysemic. Their lines have been interpreted in the following way: the logos can be understood as

much as a Law that governs the cosmos or as a form that Heraclitus has to begin his ideas. He complained incessantly about his contemporaries for not understanding the world around them.

Another part of his doctrine is the unity of opposites. Here it has been misinterpreted by Aristotle, believing that he was establishing an identity between opposites, which is evidently a contradiction. Heraclitus, however, argued that opposites are found in the same way in everything. For example, going to sleep and waking up are contrary. In this case, we see a process (go to sleep and then waking up). The opposite, being awake and then going to sleep, is the same as the previous one since one transits to the other; one opponent passes to the other. There is also a tension between the opposites that generate what we observe. It is this tension, generated by Discord, that allows the existence of certain objects such as the lyre.

The most controversial part of his doctrine are his ideas about change. "Somewhere says Heraclitus "everything moves and nothing remains" and, comparing the beings with the current of a river, he adds: "you could not dive twice in the same river"" (Plato, 2015, Cratylus, 402a). This characterization of Heraclitus turns out to be a misinterpretation of his ideas. What can be interpreted, based on the fragments we have, is that the change would maintain the identity, in the same way that a river, constantly changing, is the same. They are interconnected and inseparable things. There is no hostility against identity. However,

there are other interpretations that point out that this about change is not a metaphysical doctrine but a mere description of the world.

What is a metaphysical doctrine are the ideas of Cratylus, a follower of Herclitus who took the doctrine of change to the extreme and left aside other ideas of his mentor. “In fact, familiar first, from young, with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean opinions that all sensible things are eternally becoming and that science is not possible about them, (...)” (Aristotle, 2014, *Metaphysics* , 987a32-35). In other words, you cannot submerge in the river even once because both the river and the person are constantly changing. This is the multiple.

Plato, to solve this dilemma, creates his theory of Ideas or Forms. It establishes that the object itself is not in the sensible world, always changing, but in the world of Ideas, where everything is immutable and eternal. In other words, essence is separated from the object. Here Plato establishes the existence of the soul in the *Phaedo*, in which it identifies the soul with the Ideas. Therefore, it is immutable and eternal. For Plato, what keeps you being the same person would be the soul that is immortal in nature.

Here we must highlight the three souls of Plato: the rational soul, the irascible soul and the concupiscible soul. The first is the upper part of the soul, immortal and divine; the second is the part of the soul where will and value are situated; the third is the mortal part of the soul responsible for the passions, pleasures and sensible desires. This could be expressed in a

Triad: Ratio-Mens-Anima. In the case of Plato, each part is different and they are not connected, which in symbolic logic would be as follows:

$$R \wedge M \wedge A$$

Where:

R means Ratio or Reason

M means Mens or Mind

A means Anima or Soul

\wedge means “and”

This Triad is something that we are going to use to explain the positions of different philosophers. This Triad talks about three things that we can find in different positions throughout the history of philosophy.

1.1.1.2 Hylomorphism pointing to the problem.

Aristotle (384 BC -322 BC) is an important case in the history of Western thought. It is estimated that he wrote around 200 treatises, of which only about 31. We are talking about a thinker both multifaceted and systematic. On this occasion, we are going to limit ourselves to what is detailed in his work called Metaphysics, a text that has shaped common sense in such a way that one produces nothing but ineffability.

The origin of this name is due to Andronico of Rodas (1st century BC), to who the ordination and edition of Corpus Aristotelicum is due. Also to this peripatetic (follower of the doctrine of Aristotle) the classification of Aristotle's writings is due to him within two blocks: the esoteric or pedagogical and the exoteric or popular. The first were dedicated to his students of Aristotle, made by him, for his classes at the Lyceum. They deal in depth with complex and rigorous topics, dedicated to those who seek to dedicate themselves to study. The second ones were informative texts. They deal with issues in a broader and less rigorous way, since they are dedicated to people interested in knowledge but without any advanced training. Metaphysics is part of the first texts.

In his classification of theoretical sciences, Aristotle puts first philosophy (ontology) and theology. The God of Aristotle, however, is not similar to the Christian God. He is a God who initiates the movement and who, in turn, is thought of thought. Immaterial, immutable and necessary is its nature since through it we can explain the eternal movement, like that of the stars. This that could seem true (an object moves as long as a force pushes it and if it does not push it stops moving) is not. The inverse is correct from a physical point of view.

Aristotle is presented with an aporia based on three theses that are openly inconsistent:

- 1) There is a science of what it is as it is.
- 2) In science there is unity if there is unity in the genus of the object (what it is).

3) What is (being) lacks univocity.

What Aristotle does is to qualify the first two theses. It establishes that wisdom belongs only to the theoretical sciences. Identify four types of causes: the entity or essence, the matter, where the beginning of the movement comes from and that for which the movement takes place. It is through Aristotle that we understand change today. To be precise, through the notions of actuality and potentiality, something that wasn't found in previous philosophers as we have already analyzed.

Also through it arise many of our intuitions about the reality of mathematics. For him, mathematical objects have no existence in the sensitive objects nor separated from them but are a kind of abstraction generated by the mathematician.

He identified the substance with the entity. This would be what composes the essence of the thing. Aristotle establishes a key distinction in later thinking: matter and form. For Aristotle, these two components have obvious differences: the matter is indeterminate and without separate existence while the form is determined and separate existence. Through these concepts, we can differentiate what is given in a thing essentially (ex: being albino) of what is accidentally given (ex: being a philosopher).

This union, given in a singular thing that is identified with its essence, is what we can examine sensitive objects: composed of matter and form. This is what is called hylomorphism. It's not possible to generate matter and form since the form is towards what a generation in general tends while matter is where a generation in general is produced. This union is absolute in sensitive objects. As Aristotle (2014) puts it: "But is there a sphere outside of these or a house outside the bricks? If so, wouldn't it happen that no particular object would be generated?" (Metaphysics, 1033b20-22).

This is a criticism towards Plato, saying that there are no Forms, those immutable and eternal things that would be the essence of the thing. In fact, if the essence were separate from the thing, why couldn't we apply that idea to the Forms of which Plato speaks? So, he sees that idea ends in an absurdity.

Taking a certain interpretation in between, we can say that what keeps us through time according to Aristotle is to be preserved in the compound of matter and form something essential given in a singular thing. The examples given by Aristotle would be the chatez of one's nose or being a man as opposed to a woman. Collecting current examples, we can consider DNA, your chromosomes, the sex of your brain, among other factors. That is what is relevant in the matter.

1.1.2 Descartes.

1.1.2.1 The leap from “cogito ergo sum” to the res cogitans.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) has not only gone down in history for his contributions in mathematics such as analytic geometry (the Cartesian term that appears in the Cartesian plane is due to him), nor only for his contributions in physics (his laws of movement that would be of inspiration for Newton's laws) but also made contributions to philosophy. From him, it begins Modern philosophy and new issues are established as the mind-brain problem, free will, among others.

He is the founder of a current called rationalism. This current places its emphasis on reason as a source of true knowledge. Here we must understand the reason not in a general sense as an act where knowledge is based on what we perceive with the senses and thoughts that we may have, either from external causes (a pain generated by an object such as a needle) or internal causes (reflections on my thoughts about a topic). Here reason means all thought independently of the content that appears with independence of our senses. In other words, using reason is reflecting on things that transcend the empirical, what is given to the subject by the senses. In Descartes, this aspect is understandable. In his time, plagued by much irrationalism in a popular sense, he saw so much hope in the development of science, especially physics and mathematics.

We must make a very important clarification regarding what Descartes means. Descartes did not think that any relevant knowledge within the empirical sciences such as physics could be derived in a purely deductive way. Rather, he put a superiority of reason over the senses when we speak of truthfulness. For Descartes, it was completely legitimate to doubt what we perceive with the senses since these, often, tend to err to know the essence of an object. A clear example that can show us the power of reason is the logical deduction of certain physical effects without resorting to experience. For example, knowing several data about the fall of an object from a building of five meters, I can infer the result. This is the power of reason that Descartes speaks of.

At a certain moment, Descartes poses methodical doubt. This doubt is not like any everyday doubt but is a metaphysical doubt. A doubt about everything that seems reasonable to maintain several suspicions. This arose as a way to take advantage of the methods used in philosophy, logic (Aristotelian, that is, based on syllogisms) and mathematics. With this in mind, Descartes (2009) establishes the following precepts:

It was the first, not to admit as a true thing, as I did not know with evidence that it is; that is, carefully avoid precipitation and prevention, and not understand in my judgments nothing more than what was presented so clearly and distinctly to my spirit, that there was no occasion to question it.

The second, divide each of the difficulties that I will examine, in as many parts as possible and as many as it would require your best solution.

The third, orderly conduct my thoughts, starting with the simplest objects and easiest to know, to go gradually ascending, gradually, to the knowledge of the most composed, and even assuming an order among those who are not naturally preceded.

And the last one, to do in all such a comprehensive accounts and some reviews so general, that he was sure not to omit anything. (p.19)

At the moment of beginning this trip, Descartes is forced to establish a provisional moral. The maxims he establishes are three: the first was to follow the laws and customs of his country, which were the most sensible and the most remote from all excess. The second was to maintain a firmness and constancy in their actions, so that they do not stop from their course for puerile things. The third was to consider your actions and thoughts as the only thing you have control, saving us from focusing on things we can not achieve.

Having clarified these considerations, Descartes (2009) begins to doubt: “Having thus affirmed myself in these maxims, which I put aside together with truths of faith, which have always been first in my belief, I thought that all my other opinions I could freely start to get rid of” (p.26). This doubt, however, should not be taken as skepticism. “And it is not that I imitated the skeptics, who hesitate for only doubting and always give them irresolute; on the contrary, my purpose was not other than to consolidate myself in the truth, (...)” (Descartes, 2009, p.26). This doubt has an aim: to aspire to a method that allows us to understand the world that surrounds us.

Descartes doubted a lot of things. Doubted of the external world, the senses, the existence of other people besides him (solipsism) and doubt about the certainty of mathematics since there could be an "evil genius" that could confuse our reason and make us believe that $2 + 2 = 4$ when it could be, for example, 5. To the current reader, this may seem absurd since these truths do not depend on anything else to be true. They are eternal and necessary by themselves. However, it was a recurring theme at the time. The debate was about whether God could go beyond the Principle of Non-Contradiction and mathematical truths because of his omnipotence or not. Many considered that the truths of logic depended on God and, therefore, if He wanted, He could change these truths at his disposal.

Suddenly, Descartes (2009) finds something he cannot doubt: "But I noticed later that, wanting to think, in this way, that everything is false, it was necessary that I, what I thought, be something; (...): "I think, therefore I am""(p.30). In Latin, it would be "cogito ergo sum". From that beginning, which he considers the first of the philosophy he was seeking, he realizes that he must accept everything that is clearly and distinctly presented as true. The clear is what is caught in intuition, the obvious; what is distinct is what separated and divided ends with something absolutely clear.

Through this beginning, Descartes raises the existence of God explaining that he has an idea of perfection and, as that idea does not come from experience and because it would be

disgusting if the idea of the perfect came from a being that is not, There must be some being that has given me that idea with the gift of perfection: that being is what we know as God or infinite res. In addition, it is God who allows us to get out of solipsism since God is not a deceiver. So that's how Descartes based the knowledge.

But before reaching this foundation of knowledge, he established another distinction: res extensa and res cogitans. Seeing that he could pretend that he had no body and that there was no world where he was, he ruled that it was a substance whose essence is thought and totally different from the material: a soul or what he called res cogitans. The soul has certain innate ideas, given by God, that help us in judgments and that have an objective reality in the soul. Also this objective reality is reflected in the outside world in some way. The idea exists together with the clear and distinct content as it exists a box filled with several books.

Extension is what he called res extensa and is governed by mechanistic processes. There are differences between these two substances: the res cogitans is not divisible while the res extensa itself; in the res extensa there is change while in the res cogitans there is not; the res cogitans has free will while the res extensa does not. Here Descartes opens a problem in philosophy of the mind called mind-brain problem, which has not yet been completely resolved.

Also a pertinent question is how it is possible that mind and body are totally separated and that, paradoxically, there is a relation between these substances. Descartes hesitated on this question. He even went so far as to say that the point of contact between the soul and the body is the pineal gland. Now, thanks to neuroscience, we know that this is nonsense since the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of the mind.

Considering the Triad Ratio-Mens-Anima, Descartes wanted to reduce the soul to the mind and puts reason in another sphere:

$$R \wedge (M \leftarrow A)$$

Where:

R means Ratio or Reason

M means Mens or Mind

A means Anima or Soul

\wedge means “and”

\leftarrow means “then” or “implies”

It is important to note that Descartes limits *res cogitans* to human beings. Animals, according to Descartes, are mere machines that react to stimuli, in the same way that a hammer hits our knee and that generates a reaction. So Descartes establishes that what keeps you through time is the soul that each human individual possesses and that does not change.

1.1.3 Leibniz.

1.1.3.1 Did he follow Descartes?

Leibniz's case (1646-1716) is one of pure astonishment. He is considered by many to be the last universal genius. Diderot, a French Encyclopedist of the Enlightenment, couldn't do anything else but to praise his achievements. Like Descartes, Leibniz is a rationalist. However, his thinking is too separate from the French philosopher.

To begin with, he rejects Descartes' *res extensa*, arguing that extension is not a substance. In addition, Leibniz had as desire a reconciliation between modern philosophy and ancient, medieval and Renaissance philosophy. Unlike his contemporaries, Leibniz never wrote any treatise or text with the fundamentals of his philosophy. Instead, we have different jobs, writings and correspondences with other people from which we can draw points in common.

Leibniz begins to touch metaphysical themes with the institution of certain principles. For us some of them would be axioms but the author has said that some of them are derivations of other simpler ones. Therefore, I do not consider it appropriate to deprive the reader of the connections established by the author since it is highly probable that he misinterprets his words.

One of the most basic principles of his philosophy is the Principle of the best, which goes to say that God always acts for the best. Not only this must be understood in a moral sense but also in a metaphysical sense. God is a perfect being and, as he possesses an infinite wisdom, he would have only to act in the best possible way. One clarification about this is that God is not determined to act in the best possible way. Otherwise, there would be something above Him and it would not be, therefore, a perfect being. God always acts in this way for his determination and nothing else.

Another very interesting idea of Leibniz's thinking is his conception of truth. It is extremely likely that you believe in the correspondence theory of truth. This idea establishes that a proposition is true insofar as it corresponds to the external world and describes it accurately. This notion of truth seems very intuitive and even seems irrefutable. However, there have been different proposals throughout history and, among them, Leibniz's shows his rationalist notions. For Leibniz, a proposition is true insofar as the notion of the predicate is included in some way in that of the subject. To illustrate his point, let's see the following example:

All bachelors are unmarried.

This proposition is clearly a tautology since the essence of a bachelor (subject) is precisely being not married (predicate). In addition, the veracity of this idea does not depend on an analysis of the facts but on a mere conceptual analysis. Leibniz gives propositions of this

style the name of truths of reason. In addition to these propositions, there are other types of propositions such as the following:

In Europe, many storms occur.

This proposition contains a predicate (many storms occur) that can not be derived from a mere conceptual analysis of the subject (Europe). This knowledge is also only possible through the investigation of facts. Leibniz calls these propositions as truths of fact.

He accepted the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Reason Sufficient postulates that nothing happens without a reason or also that there is no effect without cause. This means that there is nothing that prevents me, if I have enough information, to know why certain things are in one way and not another. This principle, according to Leibniz, is a direct consequence of his conception of truth.

Leibniz's Law is the combination of two ways of expressing the same idea. The first form is known as the Identity of the Indiscernibles. This principle states that for every property F, an object x has F if and only if y has F, which implies that x is equal to y:

$$\forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy) \rightarrow x=y$$

Where:

\forall means “for each” or “for all” or “for every”

F means the property is predicated upon a being

Its inverse is the Indiscernibility of the Identicals, which is expressed as follows:

$$x = y \rightarrow \forall F (Fx \leftrightarrow Fy)$$

Although this idea seems an axiom, Leibniz doesn't take it that way. In fact, it is considered a direct consequence of the union of the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle implies that there are no purely extrinsic determinations. Any difference between substances must be found intrinsically. One of these conclusions is that there cannot be two objects with the same properties in two different space positions. Certain works in the interpretation of quantum mechanics suggest that this principle fails in the quantum domain.

The last principle that Leibniz accepts is called the Principle of Continuity. It establishes that in nature it does not jump and that there must always be the existence of some intermediate step so that one thing can be given at a certain moment and another thing at another time. This law uses it both in his metaphysics and in his mathematical writings. After all, Leibniz continues to understand many things through his ideas about calculus.

Another concept that interests us is its conception of substance, closely linked to its conception of truth. For Leibniz, a substance is an individual thing from which we can deduce all the predicates related to it. There cannot be an interaction between different substances or there can be two similar substances in two different places in space. The

substances are not divisible and, therefore, there is no res extensa. How is it possible then that we perceive the same several substances? Here come the monads.

The monads would be the ultimate metaphysical units of reality, which possess perception and appetites and those that generate the "external world" that is nothing more than a phenomenon of them. For Leibniz, mind and body do not interact but they maintain the same synchronization about the same. This was generated by God and is called pre-established harmony. God is also the cause of our perceiving reality in that intersubjective way although each monad ultimately perceives reality in its own particular way.

Entering on his position about personal identity, Leibniz has given his ideas but these have had several interpretations by various authors. Despite this, it is clear that not every opinion here falls into the same category. One interpretation that seems very accurate (taking into account the references to Leibniz that it provides) is that of Przemysław Gut. Basically points out that Leibniz thought that personal identity, in a certain way, has two parts: a metaphysical part, related to the subsistence of the substance and another moral, where psychological factors for moral responsibility come into play. In fact, he thinks that Descartes' self is not useful since he can not deal with issues such as moral responsibility, which God would never allow. In the moral part of personal identity we can include memory.

1.1.4 Spinoza.

1.1.4.1 Relation between mind and body.

Spinoza (1632-1677) has gone down in history for its curious rationalist system and for its definition of God. Accused of pantheism and atheism, synonyms in his time, the life of Spinoza was not easy at all. At the age of 24, he was expelled from the Jewish community of which he was a part and received the herem, the greatest Jewish rabbinic censorship, very similar to excommunication in the Catholic Church. From that moment, he was from place to place in Holland and he dedicated himself to polishing lenses until the end of his days.

Spinoza in his work Ethics demonstrated according to the geometric order starts with definitions, axioms and propositions that must be demonstrated, just like the procedure of Euclid in his Elements on geometry (hence the title of the work). At this time, we must differentiate the figures of Descartes and Spinoza. The concept of substance in Spinoza is radically different from that of Descartes. For Spinoza, substance is that which is itself and that does not depend on another concept to be understood (*causa sui*). That is, something that necessarily exists. So Spinoza would only conceive one substance: God. In fact, for Spinoza it's not possible that there are two or more substances in the world because, in the end, it would be the same thing. Here we see that it follows a principle that was in Leibniz that would be the Identity of the Indiscernibles.

To this substance, correspond attributes (*natura naturans*) and modes (*natura naturata*). The attributes of God would be what is part of the essence of the substance that, according to Spinoza, are infinite, of which we only perceive extension and thought. Modes are the contingent things that can be found in this substance that encompasses all reality. The modes, in turn, are determined by laws proper to the attributes of the substance. Here you can clearly see Spinoza's naturalism. For him, God would be Nature. It is also possible to identify this rationalist tendency to require the Principle of Sufficient Reason to understand what surrounds them, as was evidently the case in Leibniz.

On mind and body, Spinoza proposes that, in reality, they are the same thing. The mind is the idea of the body since all this is produced in an individual (the human being), in which these two things are united. To demonstrate this, he emphasizes that the cause depends on the effect and effect of the cause, that is, a reciprocal relationship. This is explained by his way of understanding God as a single substance, since he represents God as the set of things that possess essence and, being a good rationalist, that intelligibility product of representations possesses essence. That is, ideas are identified with objects.

The knowledge in Spinoza does not come from experience but from the innate ideas that thought possesses. Something that we must clarify, that we did not do with Descartes, is that these innate ideas are not things that we were born with but that they are things that we have a propensity to conceive naturally.

These ideas allow us to have a sure knowledge of God. So, he does not believe in the existence of false ideas. As Spinoza (2007) says:

From here it is evident that certainty is nothing but the objective essence itself; (...) From which it's evident that for the certainty of the truth, no other sign is necessary than to possess the true idea since, (...), in order to know, it's not necessary to know that I know.
(pp. 18-19)

That is to say, there are no false ideas because they don't agree with any essence, its object. The set of existing ideas are identified with the mind that, in turn, is identified with the body, the mind being the idea of the body.

Then comes the idea of conatus. For him, everything seeks to persevere in its being. This notion seems strange and we can even think of it as Spinoza's utterance to panpsychism, the idea that every object has a conscience or a soul. All this implies that being cannot be destroyed by itself but by something external. Through the conatus, derives certain affects such as desire, joy and sadness, in relation to our work, that is, to self-govern in a world of necessity and zero contingency. Hence a neutrality of values, that is, I don't want something because it's good but it is good because I want it.

Authentic happiness is achieved through the intellectual love of God based on an intuitive, non-rational knowledge as he had previously spoken. All this due to the fact that God gives

us the essence of things, of which we can give an account of our joys and sorrows. With this awareness, we can continue with the power of our understanding, which implies perfection and of which Spinoza does not conceive that perfection does not generate joy, in contrast to what is produced by the imagination, which is nothing but what generates our sufferings . This is the only way to fulfill the aspirations of the Spinozian system.

Spinoza hasn't treated the subject in a way that is obvious in his work and it can even be said that if he had an answer it is not completely satisfactory to answer our topic of interest. From this moment I will limit myself to an interpretation that, in addition to taking into account its main ideas, enjoys certain judgments that, at first sight, seem very reasonable, considering the paradoxes that would arise if Spinoza had believed x thing or another.

As we have already seen, in Spinoza there is a parallelism between mind and body, so he, when dealing with the question of thoughts, usually puts his emphasis on various bodily changes. One might think that there is only one individual since there is only one substance. But this way of understanding his thinking is unjustified by the mere fact that it separates the substantiality of individuality and, certainly, focuses on the individuality of what is part of the modes. Established the criterion for complex bodies taking into account the following facts: 1) having several bodies, being so restricted by others in such a way that they are one upon the other and 2) that their communication between movements is determined by a pattern that is self-regulation called ratio.

Again we encounter certain problems: what does Spinoza mean when he mentions this word? In the case of Heraclitus, we saw that this word (λόγος or Ratio) can be understood as a law or as a way to start his speech. In the case of Spinoza, it's an architecture, to put it in simple words. It is a relation between the movement and the rest of certain parts of the complex body in a stable and coherent way, persisting over time since otherwise everything would be a complex body. For Spinoza there are cases where losing memory doesn't mean that you stop being the same person. For example, if we lose the memory but that does not change the ratio at all. But if, to say, the ratio of the body changes, our memory is lost even if the brain, bearer of our mind, is intact and we can say we're not the same person.

The ratio preserved by conatus maintains a close relationship with our psychology. Not only is the persistence of physiological operations but also the preservation of a way of life that is appropriate for the particular human being. That lifestyle is what matters. For example, if a famous poet were attacked by an illness and, after that struggle, recovered but could not in the least recognize those works as his or have any idea how he could write such a level of beauty, then we can say with certainty that those works are not his for Spinoza.

Although the answer may be obvious, it is actually conflicting. This is so because Spinoza identifies the ratio with the essence of a thing or nature and, to top it all, to imply that several things can have the same nature. There are two alternatives: or we think that this is about degrees since, in a passage, it identifies the essence with perfection and we could say that between things there can be an asymptotic limit that is never reached and thus they differ or we can think that each a particular human being contains an additional ratio that others do not possess and, from there, differences arise. We can conclude, as it's evident, that his position is not entirely satisfactory. In principle, however, it exceeds a position that we will see next: that of John Locke.

1.1.5 John Locke.

1.1.5.1 The answer is memory.

John Locke (1632-1704) is remembered for his political ideas. He is considered the father of liberalism and an opponent of the idea of an absolute monarchy, as Thomas Hobbes had defended in the Leviathan. He did not consider the human being as bad by nature but he does not give the kindness that Rousseau gave to our species, where man is bad because of society. John Locke not only devoted himself to political issues such as tolerance, the separation between Church and State, among other issues, but he also outlined a theory of knowledge: empiricism.

Empiricism is the theory that states that our knowledge is based on experience, on sensory data. One of the differences with Descartes is that Locke does not believe in innate ideas. The innatists thought that independent knowledge of experience (eg, mathematics) and that certain things seem to us to be clearly true without any proof from experience proves the existence of innate ideas. Locke says no. This may have been gained in the experience since the mind is a "tabula rasa", a blank sheet that is filled throughout life.

He established a distinction between ideas of sensation and reflection. The first are the senses, the starting point of our relationship with the world. The second would be an internal consciousness separated from a direct relationship with the senses and that presupposes the first ideas. Defines quality to that effect that produces objects in us. There are two qualities: primary and secondary. The primaries are those that belong to the objects themselves while the secondary ones are the product of our mental representations. A clear example would be the case of the apple. The apple is round and solid (primary quality) while appearing to us as red and with a sweet taste (secondary quality).

Then comes the simple and complex ideas. The first are the ideas of sensation and reflection, the primary and secondary qualities, which are processed passively by the mind through experience. Complex ideas are an active product of the mind, by which they combine various simple ideas. Examples of simple ideas are heat and cold. The complex idea of this would be the concept of temperature. Complex ideas are classified as follows:

1) Modes or modifications: Free and arbitrary combination of ideas, which do not presuppose a substance that supports them and that are mere representations of something.

An example is the temperature. We create this through uniting the ideas of cold and heat.

However, there is not something that we perceive that we can call temperature.

2) Relationships: Comparison of two or more ideas with each other. Examples would be when we say that such an object is taller, less hard or cleaner than another.

3) Substance: Attribution of qualities to a common substrate as mere inference since we can not perceive its existence in external reality. Despite being a Lutheran, he was agnostic about the existence of the soul. On the types and degrees of knowledge, he classified them in a very particular way. (Appendix 1)

On personal identity, Locke thought that it can be derived from experience. Before speaking about the identity of people, he established two principles. The first is that two objects of the same nature cannot be in the same place at the same time and the second that no individual can be in two different places at the same time. With this, John Locke offers a definition of person as a thinking and intelligent being, who can consider himself the same thing in different times and places. Here Locke reminds us of what allows us to meet this criterion and that, moreover, it is derived from experience. For example, let's say that there are two minds: A and B. A has a body that we will call a and B has a body that we will call b. Then, imagine that we put A in b and B in a. Despite this, Locke says that the existence of A and B is maintained as long as they can remember their past. In fact, it says that asleep

we cannot be the same person as awake. There is a key difference between a human being, the soul and a person.

This conception is also influenced by encompassing the person within a frame of reference in which moral responsibility can be attributed. In fact, he himself said that person is a forensic term, from which we say that persons appropriate their acts and their merits. So a person isn't only the one who is able to remember but also a rational being that, basically, is about the same thing and not parts that would be personal identity, as in the case of Leibniz.

1.1.6. David Hume.

1.1.6.1 There is not a person named David Hume.

It is very likely that the title of this section seems strange, even you might call it absurd. This title is nothing but the logical consequence of the approaches of this great thinker: David Hume. David Hume (1711-1776) was a philosopher, economist and historian belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment. He has been a very alarming thinker in the history of philosophy, both for his theory of knowledge, which awakened Kant from his dogmatic dream and led him to write *The Critique of Pure Reason*, as well as for his ideas on morality, where Hume puts reason as the slave of the passions. In other words, reason is not the source of morals but only helps the passions with certain means that could reach the ends defined by feelings.

Like Locke, Hume is an empiricist. However, his empiricism is radical. So much so that Einstein was inspired by the way of thinking of this philosopher in order to shed light on his ideas on special and general relativity, since this had a lot of very unintuitive ideas and that was what Einstein needed to combat the Newton's ideas about space and time.

Hume begins his system by emphasizing human nature as the foundation of our knowledge. “It is evident that all sciences maintain a more or less close relationship with human nature and that, no matter how far some of them seem to separate, they always return to it one way or another” (Hume, 2012, p.12). From this idea, Hume highlights the importance of a detailed analysis of this nature to speak with certainty about various issues. With this defined, he affirms that this science of man, foundation of other sciences, should be based on experience and observation, without being able to go beyond this authority and see if several of the principles that we handle daily can be found in the science or, on the contrary, they go beyond the senses and, therefore, they are outside the extreme extension of human reason.

For Hume, perceptions are reduced to impressions and ideas. The difference, according to Hume (2012), lies in their degrees of strength and liveliness: “To the perceptions that penetrate with more force and violence we call impressions, (...). By ideas I understand the weak images of these in thought and reasoning” (p 16). In other words, ideas are after impressions. There are certain cases where one can be very similar to the other but in

general there is such a clear difference that it is advisable to put them as two groups of perceptions instead of one.

It also establishes another distinction between impressions: of sensation and reflection. The first genre arises in the soul, according to him, for unknown causes. From there, copies with less intensity come out that are what we call ideas. When those ideas reappear, the impressions that were generated at the beginning are generated, but in this case, because of the idea. These impressions belong to the second genre.

Then there is the role of memory and imagination. Memory is presented to the spirit with energy while the imagination is languid. Memory preserves the way in which objects were presented to the senses while imagination can alter both order and ideas that came from the senses. Memory has strength and vivacity superior to the imagination. It is possible that a memory that appear so weak that it seems to be a product of the imagination as well as it's possible that imagination appear so strong that it seems like memory.

On the association of ideas, realizes that there must be some universal principles, uniform regardless of time and place, to have ideas connected to each other. Otherwise, it would be random and almost impossible for us to formulate that kind of ideas. There are three: resemblance, contiguity in time and space and cause and effect (causality). Hume applies

these considerations to various topics. We are going to limit ourselves to four objects:
substance, the idea of an external world, causality and identity.

For Hume, we cannot conceive of something as a substance since we only perceive sensible qualities and, as no one would say that substance is based on those qualities but rather is the support of them, we lack empirical content of their existence. The substance is merely a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination and to which we give a name to remember them.

The idea of an external world is very doubtful. How our world is explained, through our senses. The answer is obvious: not at all. It is evident that, as it is presented to the spirit, it exists. Now, perceptions to speak of an external existence are not enough. No matter how much our imagination extends, it is neither possible nor beyond our perception. We must bear in mind that Hume rejected metaphysics and even consideration as sophistry and illusion. I do not see a computer by my side; All I have are impressions.

We usually think of the rule of cause and effect as an obvious law that can be deduced from nature. We could say without hesitation that all our considerations in the day to day depends on the veracity of this law. Hume does not agree. He questions where the necessity of this law comes from. One might object that in such a case we could say that something has come from nothing or has come from itself. He simply replies that they (the objections)

are based on the same fallacy and that they assume that by denying the necessity of the cause we are implying what we deny, which is a contradiction (Hume, 2012). So, how does causality arise?

We see that in cases where there is causality, there is succession and a constant repetition of the phenomena in the past. However, none of this allows us to obtain a necessary law. The assumption we make is based on these data, and in the future, as in the past. All this is derived from a practice of a habit, that is, always in the past that an event occurs in another side and with closeness (for example: the clash between two billiard balls). Therefore, causality is not a necessary law but also an association of events so that our mind is realized and ends in one place as a cause and another as an effect.

Hume said that the association of ideas that leads to more confusions is that of similarity. In identity, this fulfills a role with causality. So that Hume, throughout what we have seen, identity does not exist. This is best illustrated by an example. We can imagine ourselves on the beach watching the waves. For a moment, we can close our eyes for several seconds and reopen, believing that nothing has changed. Why is it the case?

For Hume, that is where our conception of identity comes from. We, since we have come to resemblance. Here the passage between the ideas is so smooth that it allows to realize a future idea with a past idea. Then we see that, similarly, we assume that this similarity is

due to an identity between the objects, which we can see a cause-effect relationship. Hume mentioned that all this is the product of the imagination and what effort of the human being to reconcile a contradiction: the difference between perceptions and a supposed idea of identity.

Up to this point, one can already be clear about what Hume's response to the problem of personal identity is: there is no self. For more or less, rather, for this set of perceptions, I can not be derived, empirically, but we can only have impressions with other people. So we can say that nothing keeps you over time because you are always in constant change in what you perceive even though this has unknown causes.

1.1.7. Immanuel Kant.

1.1.7.1 Empirical ego and transcendental ego.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is undoubtedly one of the most important philosophers of all the history of thought. He is currently remembered for his ideas on epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. Before entering into his ideas on metaphysics expressed in his work *The Critique of Pure Reason*, we must consider the context in which Kant was at the time of reflecting about 11 years to give light to this great work.

On the one hand we have rationalism, represented mainly by Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza. In the time of Kant, someone who represented rationalism in Prussia called

Christian Wolff. On him Kant is going to be based at the moment of speaking of "dogmatic rationalism". In addition, we have the British empiricism formed by John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. These were the positions with respect to the foundation of the knowledge of the time.

On the other hand, the sciences were developing, especially physics, which at that time was called natural philosophy. The physics of Newton was a great reference in Kantian thought. Through him, Kant saw that behind all science there is universal and necessary knowledge. It was not mere probabilistic knowledge but accurate knowledge. He saw the same thing reflected in mathematics as arithmetic, algebra and geometry. Certainly, mathematics differs from physics in that it does not need empirical or factual contrast.

Here Kant makes a distinction between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. A priori means "prior to" while a posteriori means "after". Previous or later to what specifically? To experience. This distinction can already be seen in other authors such as Leibniz and Hume. So what is new in Kantian thought about knowledge? The introduction of new concepts that had been linked to a priori and a posteriori judgments: analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic are judgments where the predicate is contained in the subject. Synthetic are judgments where the predicate is not contained in the subject. The latter expand our knowledge while the former does not.

Kant, believing that both mathematics and physics produce knowledge, formulates the idea of synthetic a priori judgments. That is, judgments that expand our knowledge but that are not derived from experience. In Kantian thought, analytic a posteriori judgments are a manifest contradiction.

However, coming out of Kantian thought, it's possible that the best way to characterize current science is to say that it's based on this type of judgment. A clear example would be that of water. We now know that water isn't an element as the ancient Greeks believed and that its formula is H_2O . Now, this detail we didn't know a priori but we had to resort to experience to draw that conclusion. The detail is that water = H_2O , that is, a tautology that does not provide us with knowledge but rather the predicate was already contained in the subject from the beginning. There has been certain persons that have offered reasons to believe in such propositions.

Thus, Kant begins his proposal called transcendental idealism. First, it concerns the question of space and time, an important issue of the epoch closest to philosophy. He proposes that space and time are intuitions a priori. Let's take an example to illustrate what he means.

At this moment, I am in my bed lying down, writing these lines of the monograph. I see objects around like my desk or the sofa on the side of my bed. I can also see the movement

generated by the air conditioner when it is on. Before all this, I perceive space and time. I cannot think that there are objects without space but I am able to think that there is space without objects. In the same way, I am able to think that there is time without objects in motion or with immutable objects.

These concepts, for Kant, are not empirical but a priori and are those that allow any possible experience, since they are behind all intuition or experience, in different senses. While space is external, time is clearly internal and also external. The space allows me to separate certain objects in different places and me with respect to those objects. Time, on the other hand, allows me to make sense of the coexistence of the objects of my room and of their existence over time (identity). Thus, Kant draws the foundations for mathematics from the ideas of space and time. In particular, the foundation for geometry (space) and arithmetic (time).

Afterwards, he establishes a key distinction between understanding and sensitivity. The sensitivity is about the receptivity that objects have over us, which generates mental representations. Intuition can only be sensitive. The understanding, on the other hand, deals with the way in which we think (in a particular or general way) the representations given by the senses, through concepts. In Kant, these two elements are united and, therefore, we cannot know through one without the other. With this, Kant searches for the characteristics

of the understanding and finds 12 categories, typical of the Aristotelian logic that was how logic was conceived in his time. (Appendix 2)

With these categories, we can account for what happens in the physical world. Here Kant comes to overcome Hume's critique of causality, since for him it's not the product of a habit but is part of our categories, our ways of conceptualizing the world. The thing that allows to relate each category with its respective phenomenon is the imagination. Kant also speaks of a refutation of idealism, where he states that one's perception can demonstrate the existence of external objects, that is, outside of me. With this, he tried to refute Berkeley's ideas, which established that the *res extensa* of Descartes didn't exist; There are only *res cogitans*. To exist is to be perceived (*Esse est percipi*).

Omitting a long debate about the accuracy of the refutation, if it fulfills its purpose or if, in reality, it hides some contradiction, he finds here the basis for a distinction between phenomena and noumena. The phenomena is the object insofar as it appears to us given by the categories and the noumena is the object itself, outside of our categories. For Kant, it is impossible to know the thing itself because the categories accompany us in every thought.

Seeing that both mathematics and physics produce scientific knowledge, Kant wonders if metaphysics is capable of accomplishing this. The answer with a resounding no. Why? Well, because metaphysics is about pure reason, that is, separated from all experience.

Therefore, a priori categories and intuitions would not act and, thus, it's not scientific knowledge but the misuse of reason, in other words, sophisms.

Being able to know this would mean being able to know the noumenon, which Kant didn't think it was possible in the first place. In this way, things like God, the soul and the world go beyond our possible knowledge; they are transcendent things. Although for Kant these concepts have no meaning in theoretical reason, that is, on how we can know things, they make sense in practical reason, that is, on how we should act. Only there it is legitimate to use these concepts.

In his case, he spoke of two selves, so to speak. There would be an empirical self and a transcendental self. With transcendental Kant speaks about a priori elements, as opposed to empirical ones. The empirical self is the self that captures everything received by the senses and, therefore, can be understood as an object, that is, open to our perception. The transcendental self, on the other hand, makes of all diversity of perceptions a synthetic unit since it unifies all our representations and, through that, we generate something that adds something that is not in each representation or in the mere union of representations.

In effect, it is this that allows my identity of conscience since it allows to put to each representation the proposition "I think ..." in front of it. This notion is not derived from experience and that is why Kant calls it the synthetic unity of apperception. The I here does

not exist as a substance but as a subject; that is to say, this is not something that we have but it is something that we do, something that accompanies all thinking and that is located in our understanding and allows the use of the categories. This is the self that makes us human, according to Kant.

In the case of Kant, we see that the mind has the ratio inside it in the form of the synthetic unity of apperception (giving the possibility of the categories (logic)) and that kind of vital force is part of other realm considering that Kant

$$(R \rightarrow M) \wedge A$$

Where:

R means Ratio or Reason

M means Mens or Mind

A means Anima or Soul

\wedge means “and”

\rightarrow means “then” or “implies”

1.2 Psychological continuity

1.2.1 Lewis.

1.2.1.1 R-relation y I-relation.

David Lewis is located in this debate with a position called Four-Dimensionalism. For this position, every object has a temporal and spatial part. It is considered a reductionist position although it must be said that it solves several problems of other positions in a brilliant way.

In these cases, we can consider the case of fission. Imagine that we transplanted half of your brain from patient to another body and ends up being a success. There would then be two people with same memories, same psychology and same ideas about certain subjects.

Who are you?

In that case it seems that a person has left two people who share many similarities. Lewis does not agree. For him, these people that we see have always been there but have shared the same scenario. The identity relationship or I-relation is something applicable to two states of a single person. Therefore, it is impossible for one person to have left two. The theory of people that he proposes is that a person has an R-relation that is not contained in any other. This relationship refers to the continuity of one's psychology. So we can say that if these cases happened, we would not have but one but two people.

1.2.2 Nagel.

1.2.2.1 I am my brain.

Thomas Nagel (1937) is remembered for his role in the philosophy of mind, ethics and political philosophy. Your article What Is it Like to Be a Bat? has presented many objections to the idea of reducing the mind to the brain, something that many people today do not conceive in that way but that is a prevalent view with defenders like Daniel Dennett.

Nagel's case is curious for two reasons. The first is that it tries to ground personal identity taking into account the empirical evidence available about our neurology and second because it considers that we are dealing with a problem that only allows us a definition based on common sense, as John Searle would say.

Indeed, for Nagel there must be something objective and something subjective behind the personal identity. What is the best candidate to solve this problem? It would be the brain. The brain contains a part that we can analyze in the third person while, in turn, it contains a part in the first person accessible only to the subject that would be the container of our psychological continuity.

As we have mentioned, in his case we cannot reduce the mind to the brain even though the brain maintains a physical-mental intimacy. All this maintains a type of interiority that

cannot be dissected and that generates a particular feeling: a feeling of what it feels to be conscious. For Nagel, the brain seems to be a good candidate although he mentions that it is only a hypothesis that needs to be clarified in the future with the advances of neuroscience.

1.2.3 Nozick.

1.2.3.1 Fission means death.

Robert Nozick (1938 -2002) is an American philosopher who is mainly remembered for his political philosophy. In his work *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Nozick defends the free market, libertarianism and minarchism, as opposed to anarchy and a large state. However, Nozick's personality made him write about other topics such as death, epistemology and metaphysics. Within what he talked about metaphysics, are his positions on personal identity.

On this subject, he formulates the closest continuer theory. This theory states that I in t_1 am identical with another person in t_2 if and only if there is a continuity between me and that person and there is no one else that can meet that criterion. In the way specified by Nozick, this also presupposes a causal dependence. That is, for example, if x exists in t_1 and in t_2 there exists a person y with psychological states that are due to x , with the same mental states that x and, suddenly, a person z will be generated with the same mental states as x (due to a cloning of x , to use a science fiction example), the nearest continuator with

respect to x would not be both (y and z), nor only one of the two (which many think is arbitrary) but would be only y . Thus, it is possible to solve this dilemma.

However, there is a case where there would be consequences that interest us especially: fission. Now, this possibility is being contemplated for the future. The interesting thing is that a kind of duality of the mind has been seen, which means that in a brain it is possible to find two currents of consciousness. Although this idea has fascinated several philosophers, the truth is that it is still a debate about how we should understand consciousness. In order to analyze this particular case, let's assume that this is really possible.

Imagine that the hemispheres of x are transplanted into two different bodies each. As a result, we have two people with the same mental states of x , which we will call y and z . These two people have a causal dependence with respect to x , so, looking at what has already been analyzed, there is no difference (at least obvious) between the two when we talk about psychological connectedness.

This is where Nozick raises the following: fission is death. That is, x no longer exists but now there are two people, different from x and different from each other. Thus the principle established by Nozick is saved and this question is not left as some kind of dilemma. For Nozick what keeps you over time is the psychological continuity, which presupposes a causal dependence or psychological connectedness between a person in t_1 and another in

t2. This depends on factors external to the person, which gives us a surprising thesis: identity depends on extrinsic factors and not purely on intrinsic factors.

1.2.4 Parfit.

1.2.4.1 What matters is R-relation.

Parfit's thesis goes against the purpose of this monograph. In effect, he defends that personal identity does not matter for ethics. What matters for our survival, Parfit mentions, is not personal identity (which is a very restricted concept, it's all or nothing) but the R-relation. What does he mean by this? Before explaining this, let's see why it appears in this section.

Parfit in an article entitled "*We Are Not Human Beings*" explains his position in this debate. However, it is necessary to clarify what he means by this since many misunderstandings could arise. Parfit at no time denies that what keeps us alive (for example: my body writing this section) does not exist. To understand his point you have to differentiate between an existing object and us that are persons.

For example, we can say that, at the beginning, a human being exists from conception. In time, that being changes from a zygote to an embryo, from an embryo to a fetus, from a fetus to a newborn, and so on until the death of the organism. This could be understood as a substance. We can also notice that there are phases within that substance and that we can

understand that as a person. The best analogy would be Leibniz's ideas about personal identity, where for Leibniz it was not enough for the substance to persist but for psychological characteristics to be included. However, this analogy is not perfect since the substance, in this case, is not part of the personal identity although it is related to us as persons.

Then Parfit maintains a posture called Embodied Person View. This position establishes that the animal can only think if it has a person thinking on its body as part of it. When he says that we are not human beings what he means is that we are not human animals. For example, if I transplanted my brain into another body and could continue to maintain a psychological continuity, that is, a connection with a person from the past where this person caused my present situation and maintained more or less the same psychological characteristics as memory of certain facts, ideas, personality, etc., then it is the same person.

Here it cannot be said that the animal has moved since this case is analogous to the case of a kidney transplant: one would not say that by not having a kidney it stops being an animal or that the animal leaves with the kidney. Here Parfit, to clarify the case, establishes a distinction between inner-I and outer-I. The first is the one who is the person behind all thought while the second is the one who can think only because the other thinks. Here there would be two thinking things but only one. So if I travel to another body, or I stay artificially in a robot or something similar, then I maintain myself over time.

In the same article, Parfit (2012) mentions something important despite the aforementioned:

On the true view, I claimed, although we have reasons for special concern about our future, these reasons are not given, as we assume, by the fact that this will be our future. Nor will our death be as significant as most of us believe. In my somewhat misleading slogan, personal identity is not what matters. (p. 27)

The R-relation is what matters. Identity is a one-one thing. The R-relation can be one-many or many-one. For example, if in a teletransporter, instead of doing its usual work, I duplicated on Mars, there would be two people with the same “psychology” (R-relation). What is the importance of this relation? Our survival. I, in this case, should have concerns for both and not just me since both maintain my psychology, to put it in words. That is why identity does not matter since I could die but there would be someone who would survive for me and take care, for example, of my family. That's what matters.

1.2.5 Shoemaker.

Understanding Locke's position is important to capture the ideas of Sydney Shoemaker. Without this British philosopher, it would be difficult to understand the current panorama on the subject. For him, the memory is in a privileged position since there are two things he has universally: the first is that remembering someone's past implies that we have experienced or had some knowledge of when that happened and the second, that it is impossible for I did not think I had such a memory.

Now, he distinguishes between two memories: strong memory and weak memory. The first has the aforementioned characteristics. The second is a memory that does not fulfill the aforementioned because it is so weak that we could only say that it is the memory of someone or another, not ours. This guy Shoemaker calls quasi-memory. This type of memory can not be identified in the same way as with strong memory.

However, this can benefit us and link certain actions to certain people. For example, imagine that A cried without stopping yesterday but does not remember that. Then, we have B that quasi-remembers that A cried without stopping yesterday. In this way, we can link A with that action of the past with the present. This would help us to maintain a person over time.

1.2.6 Others.

There are certain Lockeans, to describe them in the same way that Parfit describes them, which hold an interesting proposal. They argue that it is possible that there are two thinking things in a strict sense: the person and the animal. Although they can be separated in abstraction mode, the truth is that they are not numerically identical (that is, the same thing) nor totally separable.

Without omitting these details, they mention that we can identify the two thinking things as one thing. Why do they keep this strange position? The truth would not be possible without

the counterarguments of people like Eric Olson who poses a problem that has several philosophers puzzled: the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem.

1.3 Physiological approaches

1.3.1 Olson.

1.3.1.1 We are human beings.

It is clear in the case of Olson that he defends animalism, the metaphysical theory that establishes that we are not our psychology but rather we are animals. In his case, he defends that human animals are people. In fact, it is very absurd that we are not, as the vast majority of Western philosophers say. Is it not obvious that we are human animals?

To defend animalism, Eric Olson offers the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem. Right now, you read these lines and you have thoughts. We can say that there is an animal somewhere, thinking certain issues and, in turn, we can say that you are thinking. Following these premises, you are an animal. We could say that there are no human animals in the scene but this idea is extraordinary. If we say this, we could apply it to other things that are not animals and we will have the conclusion that we cannot know what we are.

Another objection would be that animals do not think. But this would lead to the proposition that a biological organism with a brain cannot think, which is, at least to the

naked eye, absurd. Finally, if we want to save some kind of psychological continuity view, we would have to say that there are two beings, you and the animal, who are thinking and have the same traits. We are presented with a dilemma: How do we know that we are not the animal and how does the animal know that it is not a person? For Olson there is no way to know it and, therefore, the most favorable thing is to say that the thinking being is an animal and therefore you are an animal.

In Olson's mind you continue over time if you are a biological organism, that is, if you have life. Think of two people: x and z. X is equal to z iff both participate in the same vital process as a biological organism. In other words, they have to be part of the life of a body.

1.3.2 Williams.

1.3.2.1 The “Self” and the Future.

Bernard Williams is more remembered for being a moral philosopher than for being an exponent of some physiological approach. However, his role in this debate has been important. In contrast to Nozick, who gave certain positions in response to this author, Bernard maintains that personal identity does not depend on extrinsic factors but only intrinsic ones. Apart from this, it maintains as doubtful the idea that we are our psychology.

There are two cases that Bernard considers in his article “*The Self and the Future*”. Imagine the case of a person A and a person B. Each one has a psychology and a body of their own.

Before thinking about the following example, we must consider that they are going to exchange brains. We can call their bodies body-A and body-B. They are told that one body will be electrocuted and the other will be given a large sum of money. It would seem reasonable to choose the body where the brain will end and choose to be electrocuted in what was previously your brain (although in practice the choice of who will end badly is arbitrary).

Now let's think of another example. Imagine that a bully comes and says that he is going to torture me tomorrow. This scares me a lot but later he tells me that certain things will happen before the torture. To begin with, I will lose the memory of this news, of all my memories and even my personality and all my psychology would change for that moment. So, do I have reason to fear? One could say no but it is not so obvious. Despite all that, I am still afraid of what will happen to me. These cases, according to Williams, are similar but we have different answers to them.

One could object that in the first there was one more person while in the second there was not. Despite this, there does not seem to be a big difference. That is, think of the following cases proposed by Williams (1970):

- (i) A is subjected to an operation which produces total amnesia;
- (ii) amnesia is produced in A, and other interference leads to certain changes in his character;

- (iii) changes in his character are produced, and at the same time certain illusory "memory" beliefs are induced in him; these are of a quite fictitious kind and do not fit the life of any actual person;
- (iv) the same as (iii), except that both the character traits and the "memory" impressions are designed to be appropriate to another current person, B;
- (v) the same as (iv), except that the result is produced by putting the information into A from the brain of B, by a method which leaves B the same as he was before;
- (vi) the same happens to A as in (v), but B is not left the same, since a similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction. (p 172)

In both (i) and (ii) and (iii) there seem to be reasons to fear. In the case of (iv) there should be no difference in the previous cases since having external "memories" as part of a model will not remove our fear and these "memories" are not memories, since they are not the product of a causal dependence, which he does not conceive.

The same applies for (v) since the only thing that changes is that the model is based on a real person, B that is a cause of that change. The same does not seem to apply to (vi).

However, if we do this we must also have done it for (v). Suggesting this means that we do not have a concrete way in which we must act, which leaves us in indeterminacy and does not serve as a guide for the expectations of our future. Therefore, we must apply it to (vi), which leaves us with the conclusion that we are our body, not our psychology.

1.3.3 Others.

Stephan Blatti defends animalism in a curious and very peculiar way. He establishes that theories about evolution say that we are descendants of ancestors who, in turn, were animals or, in this context, biological organisms. Considering that this scientific theory assumes that we are descendants of animals and as to reject this is too high a price to pay, we must reject those who are against animalism.

This doesn't mean that one cannot think that some of our ancestors weren't persons. It's possible to raise that possibility within the argument. What cannot be considered, according to him, is that things came out of evolution that aren't animals or that something cannot be identical with an animal within the theory.

To even consider a difference between the person in a metaphysical sense and the person as a term used in the theory of evolution raises two concerns. The first is that these distinctions are not taken out of the theory itself but are proposed separately. The second is how we can explain the emergence of a person from the process product of natural selection. With these difficulties, he concludes that we must be in favor of animalism and reject the other positions that are directly against it.

1.4 Anti-Criterialism

1.4.1 Merricks.

1.4.1.1 There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time.

At this point, things are going to get more complex. The ideas of Trenton Merricks have been misinterpreted within the analytical tradition and even Olson (2017) mentions that Anti-Criterialism is not properly understood. We will try to explain your ideas in the simplest and most concrete way possible, as the style of the monograph has been up to now.

He begins by emphasizing that the criterion of personal identity should not presuppose identity. For example, saying that x is numerically identical with y (the same person) with which it is identical does not tell us anything. The same goes for the idea of genuine memories. What we must have in order to establish a criterion for personal identity are necessary and sufficient information conditions. Now, he does not believe there is such a thing. There are neither necessary nor sufficient informative conditions for personal identity.

This criterion should not be understood entirely as an epistemological question. However, there may be some epistemological factor in the formulation of the criterion. There are factors that can make us believe about the identity of an object over time and that does not negate Anti-Criterialism. However, epistemological factors do not count as a criterion of

personal identity. Imagine that an alien kidnaps a loved person of yours and replaces it with a being that has the same characteristics that she had before the kidnapping. I could say that this person is the person with whom I had a good time in the past but that would not be necessary or sufficient to say that person is that dear person that I remember.

Maybe we can find that criterion of personal identity through an identity analysis. However, we can not simply say that there must be a criterion since that is extremely circular. Let's analyze the following proposition:

$A \text{ in } t \text{ is identical with } A^* \text{ in } t^*.$

This proposition, however, does not provide us with any information that is not trivial. Therefore, analyzing identity over time is something from which we can not derive a criterion of personal identity since identity presupposes the idea of equality of properties and existence in a time, as it is in the proposition, it does not tell us any informative condition for identity over time. This is maintained either applied to everything in general or exclusively to a type of object in general such as a cat.

Imagine a criterion applied to cats specifically. Some might deny that this criterion provides an analysis of the personal identity of cats and, in turn, say that this criterion gives us something about the identity of a particular cat. However, this can only throw us that the

identity consists of necessary and sufficient conditions, which rejects from the beginning and, therefore, has no reason to believe. The same can be applied to the members of a certain type of object as an animal.

From that mere fact cannot deduce a criterion of personal identity of that animal (cat in this case). They are totally different things. One could object by saying that it is possible to think of a criterion in a certain sense (for example, by saying that a mountain cannot survive a liquefaction). But this way of thinking is wrong. We know this from the very definition of mountain as something rocky and not liquid. This does not imply a criterion at all over time.

I am going to put a very common objection to this way of thinking that it would be convenient to discard from the beginning. One could imply that Anti-Criterialism says that we can be the same with anything like a cat or a tree. However, this is not the case. We could object by saying the obvious: I am just identical with myself and I do not have the characteristics of a cat or a tree. So it turns out that, at the end of it all, the idea of a criteria over time is more complicated than at first glance it'd seem to be.

Chapter II

Criticisms to the different positions

2.1 Problems with classical positions

2.1.1 Descartes.

2.1.1.1 An invalid leap.

Today, we know more about how the mind and brain work than people thought in the 17th century. The Cartesian thesis seems untenable that the mind is completely independent of the body is false, if we look at Ockham's razor. To think that the mind could not be affected by the body, seeing cases in which affecting the brain generates personality changes (such as that of Phineas Gage), among others, is something that assumes more than what is shown

manifest in real life. In other words, an interaction between mind and body would be forced into Cartesian ideas.

Beyond the factual aspects in which we can say that Descartes' ideas are refuted or, at the very least, very questionable within current scientific ideas, his ideas also suffer from theoretical problems. The point where conflict begins is in its starting point and in its final conclusions. Descartes starts from the idea of our thinking as a principle to explain all our knowledge. From here it starts from a complex base. Instead of accepting the existence of the world and then recognizing himself within that plane, Descartes does the opposite.

Every clear and distinct idea can be grasped through immediate intuition. After the cogito ergo sum we can only speak of cogitatio est, that is, I am thought. However, he interprets this idea differently. In his quest to separate mind and body, Descartes comes to the conclusion that we are talking about a substance independent of the body, the extensive res. However, after this, he resorts to innate ideas to explain various aspects of reality.

Why did he take such a brutal leap? The answer is simple: he was using two conceptions of substance. The first is the thing based solely on its properties, captured by intuition. The second, on the other hand, is the idea that substance is what supports those properties. As Villoro (2009) says:

The effective existence corresponds properly to the permanent subject of all the attributes, not to these same ones. The entity is not exhausted in any possible set of attributes; because it corresponds to a subject of inherence whose mode of existence is to be independent of thought. (p. 112)

This point is important. Descartes part of the attributes and then come to the idea of substance, which is completely illicit. Through this idea it was also possible to prove the extramental reality and not fall into a radical solipsism, because what is conceived in the mind is also real. Here come the innate ideas that would be useful for identifying substances.

The Kantian objection to such ideas is that the self would be empty because it would not be captured in the thoughts themselves. The “I”, the understanding, is only a form that accompanies every thought, but it would not be the support for them. This leap is justified only by Cartesian ambiguity in understanding “being” and “substance” but this justification makes the Cartesian system obscure and lays the groundwork for the problems of idealism that will follow later.

2.1.2 John Locke.

2.1.3.1 Memory isn't reciprocal nor transitive.

When we try to talk about the identity over time of something, be it an object or a person, we cannot put any criteria. The case of John Locke is a great example of this. As we saw

earlier, Locke thought that memory was a necessary and sufficient condition for personal identity over time. However, before taking a certain criterion for granted, it is necessary to see what identity is like in a logical way.

It is well known the principle of identity of logic, already found in Aristotle, which states that $A=A$. The homogeneous relationship cannot only be realized in this way. For example, identity is also reciprocal. If I say $A=B$, that can obviously be formulated as $B=A$. In the same way, identity is transitive. If, for example, $A=B$ and $B=C$, then $A=C$. This way of understanding identity should also apply to our criteria on personal identity. However, this does not seem to be the case.

This objection comes from the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, part of the School of Common Sense in Scotland. Let us adapt his example to more everyday conditions.

Suppose you start a career at a prestigious university. You will be given the name of person A. Then imagine another person halfway through the career. We will call this person B. And also imagine a person at the end of the bachelor's degree. We will call this person C. It is possible to think that B remembers A, maintaining the identity relationship specified by John Locke. It is possible to think that C remembers B. However, this does not mean that C remembers A.

Therefore, this identity relationship has a huge problem, which is how to maintain the relationship between A and C with the above process. The classic answer to this problem is that it is enough for C to remember B and B to A for C to be A. The classic answer to this problem is that it is enough for C to remember B and B to A for C to be A. All this would be indirect memories instead of the direct ones proposed by Locke. With this it would be possible to resolve the conflict that comes with using memory as a necessary and sufficient condition for personal identity.

2.1.3.2 Memory presupposes personal identity.

This objection comes from Bishop Joseph Butler who rejected John Locke's ideas about people's identity. The objection can be divided into two main points: those who defend Locke's position do not speak of identity and that the identity of my self is above memories. Butler mentions that experiences, contrasted with each other, cannot be one and the same experience, but have a different character that makes them be considered as two different experiences. Now, in the case of memory, we obviously see the case of two experiences and not the continuity at all times of the same thing. Simply put, the mind does not function in such a way and therefore, when someone claims that this is a criterion of personal identity, actually to have edited its true meaning.

On the other hand, our expectations are founded on the idea of identity. We wouldn't do that if we didn't think we weren't the same person. Also this can be relieved when we see it as states. We do not say that we are our thoughts or our memories, but that we are a thing that

thinks and remembers. This can be applied either to a substance understood as something that exists independently of anything else, or to a property of a substance. In both cases it can be said that memory fulfills the role of showing the previous states of these objects.

Here we can see a strong relationship between Butler's case and Reid's case. Reid characterizes memory as the testimony of the self but to say that the testimony is the cause of the testified is extremely absurd. In Reid's case, the self is a monad, as Leibniz said. However, this intuition has been questioned by people like Derek Parfit. One of the Parfitian ideas is that identity is not always determined, that is, one could not always answer the question of whether I am going to die or not given a certain case.

Let us suppose that 49% of all my current psychological aspects are taken away from me. The obvious question would be: Am I going to survive such an act or not? We can increase the percentage to something else that, in theory, should give us an opposite answer (for example, 51%). Isn't this an empty criterion because there is no clear limit? In intermediate cases it seems impossible to give an answer that accounts for our intuitions. In his article *Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons*, he uses a similar argument in favor of the Buddhist idea that there is no self, there are only perceptions as Hume also mentioned.

However, this thesis is not very intuitive under detailed analysis. The first issue we need to consider is the relation. Parfit puts this question to us as if it were about the identity through

time of an object. Although there may be similarities in certain aspects, the truth is that a person's identity does not have to imply the same result as the paradoxes of objects, such as Theseus'. This is because examples are not always synchronized. For example, if we could remove a very small part of my brain, this would make us think about whether the brain is still the same, not necessarily if I still exist or not.

Another consideration, closely related to the first, is the way in which the question is shown to us. Parfit gives these examples from a very ambiguous point of view. It does not specify what we must have in order to continue to be us, but rather puts a multiplicity of psychological factors without making hierarchies in our identity. For example, if I lose several memories, am I not still the same person? The same would happen if I stopped having certain beliefs or fervently holding ideas. If there is no answer to these questions, it is theoretically impossible to resolve these dilemmas. In fact, one can affirm that the dilemma is a product of the ambiguity of the question itself. As long as concrete details are not shown before formulating a questioning, it is not possible to speak of a dilemma properly. All this is just extrapolating a case to a terrain that may not correspond to it.

2.1.3 David Hume.

2.1.3.1 Thomas Reid's objection.

Thomas Reid's thought can be summed up as the pursuit of common sense and show as absurd anything that can reject such principles. As Lesser (1978) pointed out:

But Reid was dissatisfied with Hume's account, partly because he thought Hume had rejected far too much, and partly because of the grounds Hume gives for accepting, for example, the validity of induction, and the existence of the external physical world. Hume regards these beliefs as non-rational, and deriving from our psychological make-up; it is nature and not reason which causes the belief in an ordered physical reality. In Hume's eyes this is a sufficient justification: if our nature compels us to believe something, this is as good a ground for believing it as any other. Reid, on the other hand, believed, first, that there were many more principles of this sort than Hume had acknowledged, and secondly, that the justification of them was rational, and not merely psychologically determined, since it was based on the impossibility of thinking and acting coherently without them. Hence, even though Hume builds up with one hand what he pulls 'down with the other, and destroys the rational basis for belief only to replace it by one based on human nature and psychology, Reid continues to treat him as the arch-sceptic. (p. 42)

It is a classic his idea that I am neither a thought nor a feeling but a thing that thinks and feels. A first point he makes is the idea that pronouns found in our language are universal in the case of rational beings and this seems to show that mind is different from thought. However, as is evident, this point is not a good one. To begin with, we can use verbs for certain objects such as the plane flies or the chair is spinning. We could also resort to pronouns in cases of non-human animals such as, for example, a cat, and this does not mean that the cat, or any other animal out of necessity, is a person like us.

The other objection is that it seems incoherent to talk about events of things because, in describing the self, we are talking about a process. But a process must have a thing where it happens. Therefore, Hume's theory seems incoherent. However, Hume can respond to this problem. His theory of knowledge raises bundle theory. This idea proposes that things are his properties. For example, a whiteboard marker is not that it has the color white but that it is the color white plus other details. We don't have to say that we are talking about a process in a thing but about a process described as a thing by means of abstraction. We can see this with an example: imagine that we have separated the frames of a chapter from a series (for example, Daria). If we look closely, we see that there is a succession of events, a process. However, there is also no substance in which this resides to make sense. Hume could argue that this is the situation of beings that exist for unknown causes.

Another questionable idea is the practicality of his idea. We would not say within a society that we are a set of perceptions. However, this idea has no weight. To begin with, we do not have to use true concepts in this way. Within a society, we could quietly resort to names to identify each set of perceptions, like yours or mine. An important objection, however, is that of the ethical realm. It seems that our notions of responsibility and rights depend on the idea of an "I" behind all acts that we would see as morally reprehensible.

However, the smoky ideas about this deliberately and forcefully point to our intuitions. For Hume, it would seem possible to say that responsibility and rights can be inherited from

person to person as long as there is a causal chain of events, the event we have described above. However, if we take this idea seriously, we can only witness problems. To begin with, does this have to happen with everything? We could imagine the case in which some relevant aspect of our psychology changes such as, for example, going from being a psychopath to a neurotypical. There could still be a causal relationship between both perceptions but it does not necessarily seem licit to say that the other person must inherit the responsibility of the previous one by committing a certain immoral act (using others to achieve their ends, for example).

This idea, then, does not seem to be sustained when we seek to be practical but rather assumes as a necessary and sufficient condition for responsibility a causal relationship between experiences, which does not seem to be precise by setting different scenarios.

2.1.3.2 Kant.

From the Kantian system itself we could establish certain criticisms of what Hume said. Kant's transcendental idealism, as we have mentioned before, is not hostile to realism, although this relationship seems to be very unintuitive. As Kant (2016) mentions in the second prologue of the Critique of Pure Reason:

If intuition had to be governed by the nature of objects, I do not see how something a priori could be known about that nature. If, on the other hand, it is the object (...) that is governed by the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can easily represent such a possibility to myself. (p. 20)

Here we can see Hume's problem according to Kant. For Kant, Hume's search for an "I" would make no sense, not because there is no "I", which Hume denies, but because that "I" is behind every experience made possible by understanding. As Pakker (2013) aptly pointed out: "Whereas Hume adopted an initial view that localized the object of personal identity within perceptions alone, Kant committed himself to a transcendental deduction in which he positively legitimized the categories of the understanding, (...)" (p. 5). Thus Kant not only overcomes Hume's critique but also generates the basis for a universal and necessary knowledge.

2.2 Problems with psychological continuity

2.2.1 Reduplication argument.

Basically this idea was put forward by Bernard Williams and it seems perfectly conceivable to think that psychological continuity does not seem to be a one-to-one relationship but a one-many relationship, as fission cases suggest. Now imagine if we had a device that could be used to replicate all your memories but you die before the act. If we put two people their memories at once, erasing their memories, what would happen to you? There would be two people with the same psychological continuity and they would be indiscernible. This makes this criterion unsatisfactory.

However, it is possible to offer criteria that resolve this. One obvious one is that of Nozick. In cases of fission, where we transplant the two hemispheres of the brain into different

bodies at the same time, what happens is that we die. This criterion puts identity as an extrinsic property, not an intrinsic one, which is very problematic. How is it possible for another person or there to influence what I am now?

Parfit, to solve this, raises a distinction between survival and identity. Identity is all or nothing and is, as Williams says, one-on-one. Survival, on the other hand, is a one-many relationship and that's what matters. Lewis attacks this idea by mentioning that they are both the same and one-on-one. In this case, we would be saying that, in fission or similar cases, there were already two people from the beginning.

It is not clear, however, to what extent we can say this. Imagine that we created 20 people this way (using digital devices). Will we have to say that there were 20 people from the beginning? It doesn't seem obvious and, rather, it seems to analyze this using the result but ignoring the very nature of the object when posing this idea. Therefore, this solution is not suitable for the identity over time of people.

2.2.2 How it is possible that we are not biological organisms?

This would be Olson's reaction to the postures that give psychology a relevant role in our identity over time. Many of us who ask the question about ourselves do not doubt that we are human. In fact, it seems so usual to think in this way that this idea has become common

sense and talk about things like human rights, that such an act is human or not or that to treat a person as a mere means to an end is to deny their reality as human.

Ignoring a variety of considerations, it is clear that this idea captures several intuitions in a surprising way. For example, it makes sense to say that I weigh xx kilograms and am about 1.70 meters tall. When this human being stands in front of a mirror, am I not looking at myself? These questions were clarified by Parfit in his article *We Are Not Human Beings*. We may think that our body is merely like the clothes we have on. For example, our clothes can get dirty and we could say that we get dirty. However, this only affected the clothes, not us as people, especially if you consider only the mental properties to define a person. To say that the mind got dirty is an obvious absurdity.

In this case, Olson's problem could put a certain group of Lockeans in trouble. To say that an animal cannot think and only the person can seem to contradict biological facts. What happens when a biologist says that human beings are rational beings, able to think in complex ways thanks to the neocortex? However, this ignores the question that concerns us. Firstly, biologists, in expressing their ideas, are not defining what a person is but what a human being is.

The use of pronouns, as we have seen before, does not prove anything about whether we are talking about a person or not. Secondly, this language ignores the ideas raised in the

philosophy of the mind. There is currently a typical debate between physicalism, a materialism that proposes the reduction of the mind to the brain, and dualism, the idea that the mind cannot be reduced to the brain.

If we accept dualism, it is perfectly reasonable to say that the animal does not think. In effect, the animal produces neurochemical reactions in its brain but that is not thinking, it is not feeling, it is not a subjective experience of any kind. The person, us, would be immaterial but with a certain position. Even if we accept the idea that an animal thinks, this does not prove that we are animals. It is perfectly conceivable to say that there are two beings, the animal and I, who think the same thing. However, there is only one stream of consciousness, not two. Seeing this, there is no epistemological problem as Olson puts it.

2.3 Problems with physiological views

2.3.1 We are not human beings.

Without repeating what was mentioned in 2.2.2, the idea that we are human seems to make sense. In principle there is only one matter in space that would be a human animal.

Therefore, since there seems to be no more candidates to account for our existence and we maintain that we exist, then we should say that we are human animals. This idea would put a lot of pressure on psychological continuity, but we have to ask ourselves this question: at what price?

Equating objects with matter has a fundamental problem: it cannot explain the creation of diverse objects that are made of the same material. Let's take an example: imagine that you have wool in a time called t_1 . Now, with that wool, you create a crochet in t_2 . With this crochet, in turn, you create a scarf in t_3 . Now, both the crochet and the scarf are made of wool. However, if we say that objects are matter exclusively, then we have neither created a wool crochet nor have we created a wool crochet scarf since in t_1 , t_2 and t_3 we are talking about the same object: wool. This idea is not very intuitive and would leave several phenomena without explanation. As Wiggins (1968) would say: "The material must pre-exist the making, and survive it. But what is made cannot pre-exist its fabrication" (p. 91).

Against it, there is one point that can be said to be pertinent: the corpse argument. This argument points out that the biological organism is only a phase of the true substance, the body that is present and only when it dies. This would lead to the idea that we are a corpse, which is absurd. Therefore, this idea of identifying matter with object must be discarded.

Blatti argues that to reject that all people are human animals is to reject the existence of evolution as posed by biologists today. However, this is not as obvious as it seems. To begin with, the use of pronouns does not prove that we are talking about a person. A scientist might say: "We look a lot like chimpanzees, genetically speaking". This, on the other hand, does not speak of us but speaks of human animals. In turn, if we want to say that the

concept of person derives from this proposition, then a person would be part of an analytical judgment.

However, whether analyzing concepts or taking into account the facts of the external world, we cannot derive the concept of person and that is because person is an isolated metaphysical concept, unlike the concept of object which does belong more adequately to scientific theories. Therefore, the proposition “this human animal is a person” is a synthetic a priori judgment.

Another point to consider is that this idea is not parsimonious in qualitative aspects. On the one hand, it postulates the existence of people within the scientific theories themselves and, on the other hand, it postulates that all people are human animals in our case. But these ideas have no explanatory power within the theory of evolution. We can use the concepts of natural selection, ecological niche and species without having to talk about people. We only have to limit ourselves to human animals. Beyond the concept of animal, scientific theories could not directly answer the question of whether a human animal is a person or not.

2.3.2 Fissions and brain transplants.

The very idea of a head transplant or a brain transplant may seem like science fiction to someone. However, the idea itself does not seem theoretically impossible considering the information available on the subject. What is currently impossible is the practical aspect,

that is, the idea put into practice for both technical and ethical reasons. This has been done in the case of dogs, connecting a head into a complete body, resulting in a two-headed dog. As can be expected, the result is that the animal did not survive beyond one month and, in other cases, the result was worse. Seeing this, it is evident that this shows us new possibilities that were previously kept in speculation, such as John Locke's intuitions on the subject.

We could imagine that the brain of one organism is transplanted to another organism without a brain. The question is this: did I move to another body or did I stay in the same place and stay there but without a brain? Many would say that I have moved and that seems extremely intuitive. With that answer there is already a rejection of physiological conception since a transplant is not relevant to the organism. Let me explain.

The human being has a certain amount of organs. If we transplant one, like the liver, it doesn't have to say that the human being has died because we can keep him alive with our current technology and follow a certain vital process or maintain the same structure as a human animal. Moving an organ is not moving an animal. Therefore, moving the brain would be like moving a liver: there is no difference for the animal.

All this has to be done considering the brainstem although there is debate about whether it can be said that there is a specific point where vital processes are maintained or, on the

other hand, there is no specific point and this is holistic. In order not to enter into a debate in which I am not able to give opinions, we can start from two ideas based on both cases. On the one hand, it can be said that removing the brain stem would kill the organism and, therefore, for authors like Olson, that is death. On the other hand, if we accept Alan Shewmon's idea that such a process cannot be traced we have consequences for and against animalism.

As Olson (2016) mentions, on the one hand if we remove the whole brain, this does not symbolize the death of the organism and, therefore, our death. On the other hand, if we could connect a brain to a machine and keep it alive, we would be of an organism with the same vital process as the rest of the body that does not have a brain. In these cases we are talking about a fission between biological organisms that are human animals. If one were to die, the other would be us. But if there are both, this means that to do that is to die.

Like the psychological criterion, animalism has its problems. One might answer that we are talking about a portion of the body and therefore we would survive where there is more matter. Faced with this possibility, Sider (2005) poses a scenario related to our concerns. Think in the distant future we might be able to perform an operation on a cancer patient throughout the right hemisphere of the body and divide him in half without killing him and give him a prosthesis to save the left hemisphere. This certainly puts us in the situation that we have survived even though matter has been divided into 2 equal parts. We can edit this

to keep the human animal alive with cancer but with the curiosity to kill its brain and thus we would have a fission problem for animalism. As Olson would respond to certain problems he sees in other postures, I would not put my money into this.

Chapter III

Is there an alternative to solve this problem?

3.1 Non-reductionist solutions

3.1.1 Stances.

Before going on to see some positions, it is necessary to clarify what non-reductionism means here. It has nothing to do here, as is usually understood in Anglo-Saxon literature, with the idea that we are a monad or a res cogitans, supporting the idea of the soul. My discussion is not going to touch this position within personal identity beyond the classical positions. Here it took on the meaning given to it in the Spanish-speaking world: the idea that personal identity cannot be reduced to psychological or physiological factors.

One might reply that the same sense is applied in Anglo-Saxon literature. However, there are radical differences in how the terms are interpreted. The main difference is that in the Anglo-Saxon world the “I” is understood as something beyond biological and psychological factors in the sense that these facts do not affect it, which we could attribute to ourselves given the existing tension to account for our essence. In the Spanish-speaking world, on the other hand, the self is not considered to be beyond these factors in this sense. Instead, these factors are considered insufficient to account for our identity, and either historical-cultural (moderate) factors are used, or the position, as opposed to the Cartesian conception of the self, that the self is open and not a closed object of the rest of the world, implying that our self is the product of our interaction with other (radical) selves.

The first would be perfectly adopted by Vincent (2003) when he affirms the following: “For all this, although it would be an exaggeration to affirm, with Ortega, that man does not have nature, but history, we would have to accept that man does not only have nature, but also history” (p. 82). We can give a simple example to illustrate his point: let us think that we can replicate the psychological aspects in a digital device so that they are similar to those of Immanuel Kant, creating in turn a body similar to that of the great philosopher. The result is a person who would describe himself as Kant. Should we trust his description? This does not seem to be the case. The real Kant did not have modern technology like the Internet, nor was it in a poor economic situation (as it would be in this hypothetical case), nor was it present in a time when religiosity has declined and freedom of expression rises over the

hill. This would be a completely different person from Kant because of factors external to the self.

There is a central idea that I find problematic behind this position. How can we give a precise criterion based on historical-cultural factors? Let's put another mental experiment: let's imagine that I have cancer. I am on the verge of death but I have the possibility of putting my personality, memories, ideas, among other aspects in a digital device. Having done that, I comment that I want to wake up not immediately but in the year 2101. After I die, time passes and a person wakes up in a body in the year 2101. The question is obvious: Am I not that individual who wanted to appear at that specific time? Based on this idea, it seems safe to say that this person is not me.

The next question is pertinent: how long does it take for me to persist over time? It seems intuitive to say that if we do this but not with a difference of 82 years but with a difference of 2 years, the result would be that I have persisted. If so, what happens in the intermediate terms? The answer is not clear and it seems that we would have a temporary identity problem. This causes that the criterion exposed gives us a close number of problems that we had with the psychological continuity for the case of fission, which makes the theory not attractive but repulsive.

The radical position is represented by Arriagada in his article PERSONAL IDENTITY, DIALOGUE AND EXTENSION: WHY THERE IS NO SELF WITHOUT THE OTHERS. Arriagada (2013) mentions his motives for adopting this position are based on conflicts within the analytical tradition on this subject:

The main problem with all of these viewpoints is that they require the individual to have the ability to account for his or her identity. If she cannot, for example, access her memory “which is what happens in cases of amnesia”, her continuity as the same person cannot be guaranteed. Let's take the following example: my father “who today has amnesia or Alzheimer's” no longer remembers that he is my father. He can no longer access any relevant internal facts indicating that he is my father. He can no longer remember our holidays together last year or all the birthdays we celebrated. I can't even remember my name. Does this mean that he is no longer my father? Should I therefore treat him the way I would treat any other stranger? This dilemma is known as the diachronic problem of personal identity and states that if my father is to remain my father through time, then he must be able to account for the endurance of his fatherhood. There must be something in him that lasts and he must be able to recognize it. But what can that something be? his memory? his body? the R-Relation? (p. 63)

Here he develops the concept of the self as the center of gravity, where he exposes his ontological reality at the moment of showing its effect on the rest and on himself, giving a positive identity that others generate in him and he in others. It is enough for some individual on the outside to be the recipient of my events so that I, due to common or

extraordinary circumstances, can recover them and thus continue to exist. As Arriagada (2013) mentions, to speak of my self implies to make reference to others in myself.

This seems to solve several drawbacks within the philosophical tradition that take personal identity as a metaphysical rather than a narrative issue; at the same time, it is practical to respond to cases of people with Alzheimer's and/or amnesia. The base, although it seems sustainable, has a serious problem: how is it possible that this whole relationship is extrinsic?

Identity seems to be part of our essence, not a factor generated by the appearance of a being in a given environment with other similar beings. That does not answer the fundamental question: What am I? If there are no other selves, taking an extreme case, do I cease to exist? It doesn't seem to be the case and I don't see how this relationship with the rest affects our particularity in general. This leads me to questions where there may be I's with the same relationship to the rest of the I's and, therefore, be indiscernible. If such an idea is theoretically possible, then this criterion of personal identity advances no further than moderate non-reductionism. That puts us in the same problematic situation from the beginning.

3.1.2 My position about it.

There are many thoughts on this subject. I have only explored some of the main ones within this work. Obviously, the question remains: What can be thrown into this terrain and, in a way, into this great enterprise that constitutes metaphysics? I believe that psychological continuity gives us a necessary but not sufficient condition to account for our identity over time. However, this has not led me to accept a moderate non-reductionist position.

On the contrary, it has led me to analyse more deeply what it is licit to say about the self because of the difficulties I have been able to observe. For this I offer a conceptual framework based on 4 aspects that we must take into account to give an answer to this problem:

1. What am I?
2. What keeps me in continuity on a small scale?
3. What makes me unique?
4. What are the determinations that keep me on a large scale?

The first question is obvious to me: I am a being capable of having some subjective experience and being a center where to lodge those experiences. In other words, it would be a substance. This capacity, however, is not something potential but something actual, with which, given various conditions, it can turn its object of capacity into something in action. The second question is psychological continuity. However, certain details need to be clarified. Although I do not have a complete criterion to account for in the vast majority of

cases, I do believe that we must pay attention to certain details. The first thing is to stop seeing the subject in the abstract. We should focus on concrete details, not abstract ones. For example, does the distinction introversion/extroversion affect our self? If a neurodivergent person changes to neurotypical, can we say that it is the same person? Can we relate the self to cases where a psychological improvement but not when it gets worse within the same scope? All this must be considered before giving an answer.

The second thing is that causal connections don't have to be just natural. They can also be artificial like using a digital device for that purpose. On the third question, I propose the very obvious idea: the dissimilarity of set of perceptions throughout our history. We are a succession of perceptions, ideas and reasonings with which we can identify. If we can trace this succession in one person, we can realize that it is unique, although there may be another with the same psychological continuity. This eliminates the previous problems where identity is a one-to-one relationship and not one-to-many.

A possible objection to this idea is that we would be arguing that our particularity within the set of people is due to external factors. At the end of the day, various thoughts come to us from external causes (if we assume the existence of an external world). Examples can be stressful circumstances, being licked by a bat, losing a gift, among others. However, this does not have to be so. We can imagine the case where we will unveil the mysteries of consciousness and create a being that is mentally connected to me. With this, this being

experiences the same as me but that being is not me. It is not a center that is substance; that is me, I am a substance in space.

Another possible objection is what would happen if we change from one material substance or another by different means such as digital. Here one could say that my self does not survive such cases where I mentioned that it was feasible. However, the idea is that we are a center of experiences. The material part, in this case, would not matter as far as our individuality is concerned as long as it maintains the capacity to be a center of experiences.

On the last point I have to say that my reflections have been futile. It is not clear to me whether extrinsic or intrinsic properties (or both) should be used to refer to this aspect on a large scale. However, the question is relevant and needs to be analysed. Otherwise, we will continue with the same discourse that has given us nothing but aporias.

Conclusions

At the end of the present monographic work it is concluded that:

- The subject of personal identity is a subject that deserves not only the attention of the academy as an esoteric subject, but must leave that plane to enter the public sphere and be a subject of discussion as relevant as everything else. As we have seen throughout this work, our essence as persons is a complex question that cannot be answered with a mere analysis since it escapes that method of conceptualizing reality: the scientific method. This does not detract from the fact that there can be objectivity when we see the positions and carry out a critical analysis of their contents.

- In general, I find, as could have been seen in section 2, many problems with the idea that we are human animals. The objections of Olson and Blatti, in my opinion, are not so adequate to understand our identity over time and, at the same time, what we are, which would be what Olson would at least have defined: we are human animals. Not only does the case of brain transplantation seem to be a clear point against this position, but we can also explain the objections of its defenders, supporting continuity as a criterion of our identity over time. For example, the point that to say that we are not a human animal would imply that we do not have a certain weight, height, among other properties that the animal would have already has an answer from Parfit. We can understand the relationship between the human animal and us as the relationship that exists between us and, for example, a suit. We could say that a particular person is left watching us at a party, despite what actually receives in their photoreceptors is a suit, for example, a skeleton covering the body of the human animal. This is possible because we are incarnated in the animal as a part. Another point that has been discussed is that in space there is only one accumulation of matter and therefore we should be human animals as there is nothing else on which to base our belief that we are not. However, it is possible for two beings to share the same substrate. A clear, undisputed example would be the case of the gold lump and the gold statue. Here is a clear example of two beings in the same point of the same at the same time. Finally, another important point is the epistemological problem raised by Olson. How does the animal know it is not the person and vice versa? The simplest answer is that the animal does not think while

the person does. Even omitting this detail, we can say that they are not two currents of consciousness but only one and, therefore, there would be no epistemological problem. Moreover, the person does not appear at the same time as the animal following its trajectory over time, so they have different properties and are therefore discernible.

- Non-reductionism does not solve the problems of reductionism and, therefore, we must stay with it. On the one hand, one has a temporary problem in stating that something important in our identity is the historical and cultural context in which it takes place. On the other hand, the other position leads to the conclusion that if there are no others, there is no me, making the person and his identity something purely extrinsic, something that does not allow us to analyze our essence. We have to admit that reductionism has problems, but this does not imply that we should reject it. After all, reductionism is simpler than its counterpart so we should move forward to find answers on both sides but always with the focus on the simplest in qualitative terms.

Recommendations

At the end of the present work it is recommended:

1. A more detailed analysis of the ideas behind various mental experiments. It usually happens that the implications behind various mental experiments by the authors' judgments do not always end with the conclusions they try to demonstrate to us with their reasoning. In fact, the opposite happens very often and this also explains

(partly because the philosophical questions are complex) why there is still a lot of debate about certain statements.

2. Questioning the methodology in philosophy. This is no surprise to the person dedicated to this profession because they are very aware of their methodology. Unlike the factual sciences that require the elaboration of specific methodologies for each field of research within knowledge, the methodology of philosophy is, in short, in which what we today call philosophy can be encompassed, the following: read and think a lot. Somebody outside this field would find problems with this methodology in every corner he wants to see. But this does not make us conclude that we should declare philosophy as dead, as Stephen Hawking would say. This motivates us to better formalize our reasoning, which is a developing characteristic within the analytical tradition at the time of doing philosophy but which needs, in my humble opinion, to focus on this topic given the variety of examples that more than one could judge strongly and mercilessly.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

Agreement / Disagreement between ideas	Ambit	Level of knowledge
Identity	All the ideas that we can form	True (intuitive knowledge)
Relations	Mathematical and logical	True

	Morality	(demonstrative knowledge)
Coexistence	Objects of our experience	Probabilistic
Real existence	Self	True (intuitive knowledge)
	God	True (demonstrative knowledge)
	Individual objects of our experience	Reasonable (sensitive knowledge)

APPENDIX 2

JUDGEMENTS	CATEGORIES	PRINCIPLES OF UNDERSTANDING
I. Quantity	I. Cantidad (temporal series)	I. Quantity
1) Universal	1) Unity	("axioms of intuition")
2) Particular	2) Plurality	
3) Singular	3) Totality	
II. Quality	II. Quality (contents of time)	II. Quality
1) Affirmative	1) Reality	("anticipations of experience")
2) Negative	2) Negation	
3) Infinite	3) Limitation	
III. Relation	III. Relation (temporal order)	III. Relation
1) Categorical	1) Inherence and Subsistence	

2) Hypothetical	2) Causality and dependence	("analogies of experience")
3) Disjunctive	3) Community	
IV. Modality	IV. Modality (totality of time)	IV. Modality
1) Problematical	1) Possibility-Impossibility	("postulates of empirical thought in general")
2) Assertoric	2) Existence-Non-existence	
3) Apodictic	3) Necessity-Contingency	

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